STATE OF THE UNION SUMMARY OF BRITISH DEFENCE PRIORITIES

By Nicholas Drummond

Eight months after the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper were published, this article looks at UK defence as a whole to consider where we are and where we are going. It considers potential gaps and sets an agenda for those responsible for managing and funding Britain’s most important defence capabilities.

CONTENTS

01.  Introduction
02.  Strategic imperatives
03.  Royal Navy
04.  British Army
05.  Royal Air Force
06.  Other areas
07.  Defence export opportunities
08.  Summary

01.  INTRODUCTION

Britain has the world’s six largest economy and the fifth highest defence expenditure. The armed services employ 145,000 personnel, while the defence industry supports around 130,000 jobs. The money we spend on defence is an insurance policy with our security ultimately backed-up by the nuclear deterrent. Possessing nuclear weapons, which we hope never to use and that cost so much, makes them controversial. But they have kept the peace since 1945 and mean we need to spend less on conventional forces. A core issue is, given our nuclear capabilities, what level of conventional forces do we need to maintain? If conventional mass and capabilities fall beyond a certain level, we could find ourselves in a position where our only response to a non-nuclear attack would be to use nuclear weapons.

We spend £40 billion a year on defence or approximately 2% of GDP. About half that money is spent on developing and fielding new capabilities. The rest pays for personnel, infrastructure and equipment support. Given the significant resources allocated to defence and the relative freedom that each service has in choosing how they spend their budget, the need for political oversight is paramount. The perennial question is do we get sufficient value for money from what we spend on defence? Unending requests for additional cash, combined with the three services’ poor record for living within their budgets, and a failure to deliver major programmes on time and within agreed financial limits, were longstanding sources of Government frustration prior to the global financial crisis of 2008. The fact that these concerns remain a problem today means there is continued tension between ministers and service chiefs.

With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan now behind us, there was recognition that we needed to redefine and rebalance UK defence priorities. The goal of the 2021 Integrated Review was therefore to align defence policy with foreign policy. Instead of trying to fulfil multiple commitments to a mediocre standard, the challenge was identify a more focused set of priorities and to resource them properly. The aspiration was to make defence relevant and credible, but also affordable and sustainable going forward. 

The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been successful in redefining their areas of focus. However, the Army has strangely struggled define and communicate what it exists to do. Its cause has not been helped by the fact that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are generally considered to be strategic failures. The Army likes to blame politicians who it believes failed to provide it with the resources needed to achieve success, but an inability to achieve military objectives that it agreed were realistic prior to the deployment of boots on the ground means it must shoulder some of the blame. A cloud of mismanagement hangs over the Army and to some extent this has eroded confidence and trust in its senior leadership.

Against the above backdrop, the world has become more dangerous and volatile than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War. Rather than re-equipping Britain’s armed forces so that they are able to respond to new challenges, each service has shrunk considerably in size since 2010. The wholesale renewal of key capabilities has been delayed, deleted or scaled back. Like postponing roof repairs for a house, this has increased the scope of work that needs to be done and inflated the cost of restoring a competitive military advantage.

Looking at Britain’s armed forces together, the glass is half full not half empty. We possess a superb array of defence capabilities. many of which can rightly be considered to set benchmark standards within their category. The Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers and Astute Class nuclear attack submarines exemplify this. The RAF’s Typhoon fighter, A400M transport aircraft and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are best-of-breed aircraft. Missile systems like the Army’s Javelin, Starstreak HVM, Sea / Land Ceptor, and Brimstone deliver decisive firepower. Despite many bright spots, we cannot pretend that there aren’t serious gaps in the United Kingdom’s capacity to provide a timely and effective response to an unexpected crisis. Selecting and supporting our most critical defence priorities requires us to make difficult choices. While we continue to reconfigure our forces around the most essential tasks, we must resist the false assumption that defence offers further scope to reduce government expenditure. In fact, we may have reached a point where we need to ramp-up defence spending to deter evolving threats.

02.  STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

What are the threats we must counter? The principal concern is China. Its increasingly aggressive pursuit of political and economic hegemony have resulted in a clear shift in its status from partner to potential adversary. Ongoing efforts to reinforce its superpower status through increased military spending, have resulted in a return of greater power competition. This mirrors the Cold War NATO / Soviet Union stand-off that took place from 1949 to 1989; however, the risk posed by China is centred on the Indo-Pacific region, not Europe. While Britain should be mindful of China, it needs to focus on threats closer to home, something reflected by the integrated Review which describes our emerging strategy as a “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific, rather than a complete “pivot.” 

Within Europe, deterring Russia continues to be the key challenge. Its activities below the threshold of conflict demand a response, but this should be based on the effect of hard power, rather than information or proxy warfare. Indeed, allocating scarce resources to “grey zone” activities could not only trigger a confrontation, but dilute the critical mass we need to counter real aggression. The threat to the Baltic States is real as shown by the conflict that continues to play-out in Ukraine. Separately to this, and in response to sanctions, Russia continues to conduct cyber attacks as well as testing UK defences through regular aerial and maritime incursions. Russia’s closeness to China also poses a problem. 

Iran continues to sponsor terrorism and may seek to support the Taliban financially as it exercises greater control over Afghanistan. The threat posed by Iran’s ongoing atomic weapons programme could trigger a regional conflict that might include a nuclear exchange. North Korea also seeks to acquire WMD and perceives the USA to be weaker under Biden than Trump. It could test the USA by overtly threatening South Korea again. The spectre of Islamic extremist terrorism has not gone away. Terror groups continue to operate in the Middle East, Africa and at home. 

Many of the threats we face coalesce in Africa with both Russia and China supplying local armies with military equipment as they seek to wield greater influence and to unlock economic opportunities across this continent. China’s “Belt & Road” strategy seeks to secure access to and control of scarce resources. The risk of coups in lesser developed African countries paves the way for corrupt governments, extremism, civil war and humanitarian crises. Britain’s current mission in Mali is a recognition of the dangers that exist in this region.

The indeterminate success of recent deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that nation-building is no longer a viable tool of foreign policy. Diplomacy and international development programmes may be a better approach. We still need to define the circumstances that would justify discretionary interventions. In any event, we are unlikely to resort to the use of force independently.  The most likely scenario is a deployment in partnership with key NATO allies or under the aegis of the United Nations. We may decide to fight minor wars of choice in future, but these cannot distract us from the need to be prepared to fight wars of national survival. Cold War 2.0 requires us to prepare for high intensity warfare against peer adversaries, rather than low intensity skirmishes against asymmetric enemies.

When it comes to predicting future conflicts, we have a perfect record – we have not been correct once. This means we need a range of flexible capabilities and forces able to respond across multiple scenarios. As post-Brexit Britain looks beyond Europe for trading opportunities, the need to protect national interests internationally implies forces that are expeditionary by design. 

03.  ROYAL NAVY

The Royal Navy has enjoyed a resurgence over the last decade. The commissioning of the two Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers has restored a carrier strike capability second only to that of the US Navy, making us less dependent on overseas powers’ airfields when we need to conduct air strikes at reach. At 65,000 tonnes, the carriers are the largest ships to enter Royal Navy service. With a price tag of £3.5 billion each they are also the most expensive. The size was justified by the need to carry up to 36 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters when in reality we are unlikely to put more than 24 aircraft aboard them. So the question of whether two 45,000-tonne carriers at a lesser cost would have been a better use of tax payers’ money remains pertinent to ensure the Navy lives within its means when it purchases the next new class of warship. A further concern is that the carriers are increasingly vulnerable to hypersonic missiles and drone swarms. Both threats are difficult to defend against. 

Despite the cost of the F-35, there should be no doubt about its performance. The total number to be acquired has yet to be decided, although we have so far committed to 48 airframes. It has been suggested that at least 90 are needed to ensure three squadrons of 12 aircraft per carrier, plus a training squadron and a few spares. If a number close to the original estimated total of 138 can be achieved, this would also help to offset the decline in RAF combat aircraft numbers since both Harrier and Tornado were retired. 

The carriers are dependent on the Merlin helicopter for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and airborne early warning (AEW&C) tasks. While the Merlin ASW version is hugely capable, there are concerns that the Merlin AEW&C version (called Crowsnest) is not up to the task. As things stand, the Royal Navy’s Merlin Mk 2 fleet is overstretched with a total of 30 aircraft to provide an anti-submarine capability for its carriers, destroyers and frigates. Merlin is expected to remain in service until 2040. Ideally, the airframe would be upgraded and production restarted at a slow rate to increase numbers, replacing Merlins with Merlins.  

The Type 26 City Class and Type 31 Inspiration Class of frigates promise to deliver warships that combine best-in-class capabilities with critical mass. Unfortunately, the first of eight Type 26 ASW frigates will not enter service until 2026. As older frigates start to be retired, we will enter a decade of “frigate risk” forcing us to rely on the older Type 23 frigates until their replacements are ready. 

The six Daring Class of Type 45 destroyers are highly capable air defence warships. Unfortunately, all vessels have been beset by a fundamental engine design problem which has chronically impacted fleet availability. Although a fix has been developed, the PIP upgrade programme has been painfully slow with only one of the six vessels currently deployable. There is an urgent need to understand what is delaying the roll-out. This means we are also entering a period of “destroyer risk,” which will last until the PIP is completed for all ships and the Sea Ceptor air defence missile upgrade is complete. 

The Dreadnought nuclear deterrent (SSBN) renewal programme will replace the Navy’s existing ballistic missile submarines with four new ones. The programme is expected to deliver an assured capability in this area. The Astute Class of seven attack submarine (SSN) programme is ongoing with four boats delivered, one undergoing sea trials, and the two final boats under construction. This will provide the UK with an unmatched capability in this area. However, seven SSNs is not enough to meet our needs. With UK industry operating at full capacity to build the Dreadnought Class of nuclear missile submarines, we are unable to build more attack submarines. Moreover, cost increases during the Astute programme make a larger SSN fleet unrealistic at this time. The AUKUS submarine deal will pave the way for a new class of attack submarine. A larger number of vessels sharing a common design and components will reduce costs. When we replace the Astute Class, we should plan to acquire 8 not 7 boats. Long-term, the Navy will need to invest in underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs) to offset the reduction in submarine numbers. Whatever the future solution, we should be in no doubt about the importance of the underwater domain.

Delays to Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ship programme leave the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) dependent on a single old vessel, but there is not much that can be done to remedy this until the new FSS programme delivers. The Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) fleet also needs to be replaced. It is expected that a new mine-clearance concept incorporating autonomous vessels will be adopted, although some senior naval officers are worried that this may not give us critical mass of ships. Further to this, the existing MCM fleet provides an extra number of hulls for patrol duties that boosts overall surface fleet numbers and thus increases the Navy’s coverage. 

The Future Commando Force and Littoral Response Groups concepts make some sense, but cannot mask the fact we are downgrading the Royal Marines’ amphibious capability. More broadly, there is a concern that the Royal Navy is stretched too thin. It has too many commitments, but too few ships and crews. Commitments in the Indo-Pacific in addition to the Gulf region may be too much, when our main focus must be containing Russia in the Euro-Atlantic / High North. In the event of a serious conflict, the Royal Navy risks being everywhere and nowhere.

04.  BRITISH ARMY

The British Army is in a state of crisis at the moment. Two recent books on Iraq and Afghanistan have severely criticised its post-9/11 performance. Simon Akam’s The Changing of the Guard and Ben Barry’s Blood, Metal and Dust provide different vastly different perspectives of the two conflicts but reach the same conclusions. Both regard the two conflicts as strategic defeats.

The Army has been fighting a battle to renew itself, but it has constantly changed its mind about where its priorities lie. It is now clear that it must move away from counter-insurgency roles towards countering renewed peer adversary threats. However, it has so far failed to develop a compelling future plan. The Army’s Integrated Review strategy is a train wreck. It was told that its previous aspirations, to field two Strike Brigades and two Armoured infantry Brigades were unaffordable. Consequently, the Warrior IFV capability sustainment programme was cancelled and the fleet will be retired by 2025. The Challenger 2 MBT fleet will be upgraded, but only 148 tanks will be modernised out of 227. To a certain extent, the Boxer MIV programme will offset the loss of Warrior, but if Army wishes to conduct high intensity operations against peer adversaries in northern Europe in winter it will need a fleet of medium tracked platforms including an IFV.

The armies of France, Italy and Germany all possess a minimum of 8 to 10 deployable brigades, with a large proportion being high-end heavy armour formations. If Britain cannot field 5 or 6 deployable brigades with at least two heavy armour brigades, then we really are in big trouble. The belief that heavy armour is redundant needs to be challenged. Potential adversaries are investing substantial resources to build larger MBT and IFV fleets. Britain cannot be an effective coalition partner to our NATO allies without rebuilding in this area. Though heavy tracked vehicles are difficult to deploy and vulnerable to UAVs and loitering munitions, nothing else can provide the mix of firepower, protection and mobility to seize and hold contested territory. 

Part of the Army’s problem is that it has mismanaged some of its modernisation programmes, several of which are late or have failed to deliver. But this isn’t entirely the Army’s fault. The delay in allocating funds for modernisation means that five Category A programmes have needed to run simultaneously. It simply doesn’t have the resources to run so many large acquisitions. A further issue is that industry has let down the Army. The Government’s Independent Projects Authority reported in April 2021 that the new Ajax reconnaissance vehicle was undeliverable due to noise and vibration problems. It has since emerged that 310 soldiers suffered health issues during trials. If Ajax is genuinely undeliverable and needs to be cancelled, an alternative will need to be found. 

If the Army had to fight tonight, it is unlikely that it could deploy a single brigade let alone two to counter peer threats. The only deployable vehicles the Army has at the moment are its “Dogs of War,’ the protected mobility fleet. None of these are ideal for high intensity warfare against peer adversaries.

The Army’s artillery systems also need a fundamental recapitalisation to ensure it can bring a credible weight of fire to any future conflict. It needs a new communications and information system (CIS). However, a further programme to replace its existing Bowman CIS, LEtacCIS / Morpheus, is also in trouble with the contractor needing more time and money to deliver what has already been agreed and paid for. 

The Army’s contribution to the Defence Command Paper was so poor that a further initiative to reconfigure it was undertaken, Project Embankment. The aim was to make sense of its high level strategy, but months later, the revised Army 2030 plan still hasn’t been published. Instead of focusing on rebuilding a war fighting capability to counter peer adversaries, the Army intends to generate a larger number of special forces units, including a new Ranger Regiment. It is almost as if it has abandoned high end war fighting because it is incapable of managing programmes that would deliver the relevant capabilities.  

Challenges faced by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force can mostly be attributed to a shortage of financial resources, not a failure of strategy. But the Army’s issues appear to be more deep-rooted. It may need reform on the scale of Haldane or Caldwell to restore it. Part of the problem is that non-military audiences readily understand what warships and combat aircraft do. Thus it is easier to justify Royal Navy and RAF deployments. In contrast, Army units are complex and multi-faceted. It is more difficult to deploy and requires more resources to sustain it in the field. Brigades are like orchestras with an array of different units needed to achieve effect. This makes the Army difficult and expensive to use.

There is also a cultural problem. The Army remains hierarchical, bureaucratic and top heavy. Its bloated rank structure is inconsistent with large commercial organisations which use flatter management structures to foster teamwork and leverage specialist expertise. The Army does not encourage dissent or challenge. Correspondingly, it is not good at engaging with the Government to defend its interests. The Army divides responsibility between multiple departments so that there is no direct accountability. Its leaders need to be more like the Government, where cabinet ministers are sacked from top roles, but move to the back benches and continue as MPs, rather than leaving Parliament altogether. During WW2, plenty of brigade, divisional and corps commanders were relieved of command, but still made a useful contribution in lesser roles. 

Ultimately, delayed and failed procurement programmes have led to an abandonment of high-end  capabilities in favour of special operations units. Until the Army recognises the importance of deterrence, mass and high intensity expeditionary warfare, it will lack the credibility it craves, despite performing exceptionally well during the recent evacuation of Kabul.

05.  ROYAL AIR FORCE

The RAF has a clear sense of its priorities, but it is not without problems. A major concern is the number of frontline Typhoon Squadrons that protect UK airspace. The RAF has 119 Typhoons in active use out of a fleet total of 157 aircraft purchased. According to a National Audi Office assessment, Typhoon development, production and upgrade costs were £22.9 billion, with total programme costs expected to be close to £37 billion, making this the single most expensive UK defence capability after the nuclear deterrent. Some 29 older Tranche 1 Typhoons are expected to be retired by 2025, leading to a final fleet size of 131 aircraft after other Tranche 1 aircraft are upgraded. Additionally, as noted above, Britain has committed to purchasing a total of 48 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. This amounts to an expected future fast jet fleet of just 179 aircraft, the lowest in UK post-war history. 

The purchase of just three instead of five Boeing E-7 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft to replace the Boeing AWACS fleet is sub-optimal. Similarly, acquiring only nine P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) instead of 12 or 14 is also insufficient to ensure the RAF’s desired level of coverage. The manner in which the E-7 Wedgetail was procured single-source also raised eyebrows, especially when SAAB’s GlobalEye offering was so compelling.

In the light of the recent RAF evacuation from Kabul, the decision to retire the C-130 fleet of 14 aircraft early seems ill-judged. It is also inconsistent with reconfiguring the Army around an expeditionary capability. If the decision to retire the C-130 was reversed, it would not require significant investment to sustain the fleet in service to 2040, because it benefitted from a £110 million life-extension program between 2017 and 2020. Obsolescence issues were somewhat exaggerated to justify the C-130J’s retirement, but it was only acquired in 1999, two years before the C-17A. 

If we insist on focusing the strategic air transport fleet around fewer aircraft types, then we must commit to acquiring an additional quantity of A400M Atlas. This may actually be the best option. Despite initial teething problems, it has matured well, meeting successive capability milestones, including parachute delivery and austere runway operations, so that it is now superior to the C-130J. If the RAF were to acquire an additional 10 A400M for a total fleet size of 32 aircraft, this would more than offset the loss of the 14 C-130J, because the A400M has almost double the payload. 

The C-17 has more than proved its worth over the last decade. With a payload of 77.5 tonnes, including an ability to carry main battle tanks, it was the workhorse of Operation Pitting. While we might wish to acquire more aircraft of this type, the production line has now closed. It is unlikely that any other operator would sell or lease aircraft to us, but if were possible to acquire an additional 2-3 aircraft, we should jump at any such opportunity. A total fleet of 10 C-17A plus 32 A400M would be consistent with our aspirations to deploy an air manoeuvre brigade.

Achieving reach within a global context remains a major challenge for the RAF. It is wholly reliant  on its fleet of 14 A330 Voyager tanker aircraft to strike targets at reach. To some extent, the Navy’s carriers address this requirement, but the F-35 has a limited operational range. The Reaper (and soon Protector) RPAS fleets have to some extent restored a long-range capability, but we still need to be able to conduct a long-range strikes that are less dependent on air-to-air refuelling and escort aircraft. This makes it important for Tempest and the Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft (LANCA) combat drone to include the long-range performance characteristics that were lost when Vulcan and Canberra were retired.

The RAF’s support helicopter fleet offers superb utility and is relevant for disaster relief as well as regular battlefield roles. The Boeing CH-47 Chinook is particularly capable and flexible. The decision to upgrade it was a wise move. There are also plans to replace the RAF’s 24 Puma support helicopters with a new type. The Agusta Westland AW149 and Airbus H175M are strong candidates that would both be built in the UK. The RAF and Royal Navy are keen to acquire the Bell MV22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft; however, this is an expensive aircraft ($100 million each) with low fleet availability due to its complexity. It would be better to wait and see whether the US Army’s Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program delivers a machine that offers greater utility / reliability at a lower price. 

Outsourced pilot training has proved to be far from ideal for the RAF. The PFC solution needs to be revised to ensure it is fit for purpose. Finally, a question mark hangs over the RAF Regiment. In an era when headcount is chronically stretched, does it make sense for the RAF to employ 2,000 personnel in an airfield protection role, especially when the RAF Regiment’s services were eschewed in favour of 16 Air Assault Brigade during the exit from Kabul? 

06. OTHER AREAS

Space, Cyber, Electronic Warfare, Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems have become important new domains. In particular, delivering satellites into space to support communications and the GPS network and preventing them from being electronically compromised will become a more urgent priority. As all three services try to offset reductions in headcount, automated and remotely control systems will play an increased role. Artificial intelligence systems can help to reduce the cognitive burden as well as making-up for reduced numbers. A key concern is that we cannot invest in these emerging areas, which are still largely unproven in combat, until we have restored our primary capabilities to an acceptable degree. A critical mass of legacy systems is vital to de-risk new technology as it matures. 

The need to consider additional domains further dilutes what is already an overstretched defence budget. While the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper were fundamentally about defining a new strategic blueprint, they unavoidably included a subtraction of capability across certain areas. The £16 billion that has since been added to the budget is most welcome, but it must be seen for what it is: a means of ensuring that current plans are deliverable, not an excuse for service chiefs to go on a spending spree. Ultimately, defence spending has been on a downward curve since 1990. The time has come to increase it proactively, rather being caught-out by unforeseen world events that force us to react rapidly after the fact instead of before. 

07.  DEFENCE EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES

Investment in defence is seen as a crucial element of the Government’s national prosperity and “Levelling-up” agendas. In the maritime domain, the establishment of a UK National Shipbuilding Office will do much to promote Britain’s expertise in this area and thus fuel exports. The recently announced AUKUS alliance and joint submarine programme is a bold initiative that will improve security in the Indo-Pacific region, but it is also an unprecedented opportunity to export submarine-building expertise in partnership with the USA. If this leads to a multi-national nuclear attack submarine programme with 30-40 boats being built, it will dramatically reduce the cost of future SSNs for the UK. It may also create further export opportunities. 

The Type 26 frigate design has already been selected for Australia’s SEA 5000 frigate requirement and also for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) competition. Given its sophistication and cost, it may have limited appeal beyond nations with larger economies. The Type 31 frigate, however, is a less costly warship, giving it a wider appeal to export customers. The recently announced Type 32 frigate will be developed specifically with affordability in mind.

In the air domain, the UK’s Tempest next generation combat aircraft programme, which is being conducted in partnership with Sweden and Italy, has strong export potential. Following in the footsteps of the Typhoon Eurofighter, Tempest will compete with France’s new SCAF aircraft programme, which is in many ways similar in concept. It could make sense to combine both programmes in a single European sixth generation stealth aircraft, but the political and diplomatic fallout following from the AUKUS announcement may make such a cooperation challenging in the short-term.

As the Airbus A400M begins to outperform the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, this also has the potential to replace legacy fleets. Although manufactured in Spain, it supports an extensive UK supply chain. 

In the land domain, Britain has rejoined the OCCAR partnership in order to acquire the Boxer 8×8 vehicle. As a result we have obtained manufacturing and export rights for the platform. Plans are already in motion to export Boxer to the Middle East. The vehicle is a transformational capability that is more than able to replace older wheeled and tracked armoured vehicle types, so it has considerable international sales potential.

Perhaps the area of defence with the most export potential is that of emerging technology. Remotely operated systems and artificial intelligence can increase critical mass while reducing the number of personnel required to operate sophisticated systems. Anything that is less costly to operate will have a wider appeal. A second area is quantum computing and its potential to leverage big data for the battlefield. In the short-term, the most pressing need is harnessing technology to offset the effects of global warming. As armed forces consider options to reduce their environmental impact, eco-friendly propulsion systems will grow in importance. Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are preferable to internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) for smaller, lighter vehicles, but the energy density of current batteries is still sub-optimal. The advent of solid state batteries promises to increase autonomy while reducing weight, but so far they remain an aspiration more than a reality. Hybrid drives are starting to appear, but we cannot expect military vehicles weighing more than 20 tonnes to go fully electric until commercial truck fleets adopt BEV technology that offers reliable performance at current weights. For very large vehicles, as well as ships and aircraft, hydrogen fuel (HFC) technology may be the way ahead. The key to sustainable HFC propulsion is the ability to generate green hydrogen at scale and to distribute this via a national infrastructure. We are still long way from being able to do this, but such technology offers export potential if we can develop innovative solutions.

08. SUMMARY

The key question is what level of increased defence expenditure is needed to counter the growing threats we face? Our most expensive capability, the Trident nuclear deterrent, is also our most critical, because it is the ultimate guarantee of our security. The need for complete certainty that it would perform as required if needed it is what makes it so costly. While Trident reduces what we need to spend on conventional forces, a total reliance on nuclear weapons means they become the only option in the event of a major attack. So we need to balance the minimum level of conventional forces needed to deter a non-nuclear attack with what we can realistically afford. 

The Royal Navy is in good shape with three new classes of surface combatant in development or being manufactured. The AUKUS attack submarine deal will maintain excellence in warfare below the waves. Issues with the Type 45 Destroyer must be resolved, as this warship is crucial to protecting the carriers. While the Navy is well equipped, it cannot focus on the Indo-Pacific at the expense of North Atlantic priorities. 

The Royal Air Force is also doing well, but lacks mass. The total number of F-35 aircraft must be maximised, with at least 90 airframes being purchased. It should also acquire two additional E7 Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft as soon as this is affordable. Thirdly, the decision to retire the C-130 fleet should be reviewed. 

It seems as if the Royal Navy and RAF have been prioritised at the expense of the Army. The loss of headcount and failure to renew armoured vehicle capabilities have diminished it considerably. It needs serious attention to restore its combat power. Two light, two medium and two heavy armour brigades supported by a special operations brigade (or seven combat brigades in total) is not unreasonable compared to the armies of our European NATO allies, e.g. France, Germany and Italy, each of which has at least eight combat brigades. It is also the minimum we need to be able to operate in partnership with key allies, especially the United States of America. We must invest in more protected vehicles, including heavy armour, and artillery systems. 

Perhaps the most critical issue to address is the continued reduction in headcount. Having fewer sailors, soldiers and air crew limits our ability to operate the equipment we have, but also reduces force generation cycles. Some battalions were deployed to Afghanistan more than three times. Trying to live within allocated budgets has forced economies to be made. Accommodation, training facilities and other resources are suffering from a lack of investment. Quality of life for service personnel has suffered as a consequence. These things directly impact morale which affects retention and recruitment.

In the final analysis, it is often said that there are no votes in defence. When cuts are made, they may not be politically damaging, but there comes a point where our armed forces are no longer able to perform the tasks they previously took for granted. Given the sustained decline in defence since 1990 and the foreign policy aspirations set out by the 2021 Defence Command Paper, there is still a mismatch between the commitments we believe are essential and the resources available to fulfil them. 

It seems as if the Royal Navy and RAF have been prioritised at the expense of the Army. The loss of headcount and failure to renew armoured vehicle capabilities have diminished it considerably. It needs serious attention to restore its combat power. Two light, two medium and two heavy armour brigades supported by a special operations brigade (or seven combat brigades in total) is not unreasonable compared to the armies of our European NATO allies, e.g. France, Germany and Italy, each of which has at least 8 or 9 combat brigades. It is also the minimum we need to be able to operate in partnership with key allies, especially the United States of America. We must invest in more protected vehicles, including heavy armour. 

Perhaps the most critical issue to address is the continued reduction in headcount. Having fewer sailors, soldiers and air crew limits our ability to operate the equipment we have, but also reduces force generation cycles. Some battalions were deployed to Afghanistan more than three times. Trying to live within allocated budgets has forced economies to be made. Accommodation, training facilities and other resources are suffering from a lack of investment. Quality of life for service personnel has suffered as a consequence. These things directly impact morale which affects retention and recruitment. We should also remember that the effectiveness of everything Britain’s armed forces try to do boils down to its people. Attracting, training, rewarding and retaining talented men and women must be our No. 1 priority.

In the final analysis, it is often said that there are no votes in defence. When cuts are made, they may not be politically damaging, but there comes a point where our armed forces are no longer able to perform the tasks they previously took for granted. Given the sustained decline in defence since 1990 and the foreign policy aspirations set out by the 2021 Defence Command Paper, there is still a mismatch between the commitments we believe are essential and the resources available to fulfil them.