WHY THE BRITISH ARMY NEEDS TO ADOPT A TWO DIVISION MODEL

By Nicholas Drummond 

This article considers the merits of the British Army generating two war fighting divisions rather than the single division planned hitherto. The key driver for a revised structure is new multi-domain warfare doctrine and the way in which it evolves how we expect to fight in the future.

Although it has not yet been published, the British Army’s revised “Future Soldier” strategy plans to adopt a two division model. 1st (UK) Division will be a light division with two light mechanised brigades (7th and 11th) plus 16th Air Assault Brigade, while 3rd (UK) Division will be a heavy division with two armoured brigades (12th and 20th) plus 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike brigade. This is definitely a step in the right direction, but is not yet an ideal structure. What the revised structure effectively delivers at this stage is an expeditionary division that can respond quickly while having a reduced logistical footprint, plus a manoeuvre division that can bring decisive combat power while being more resilient. The expeditionary division is ideal to fight the First Battle / Deep Battle while the manoeuvre division is suited to fighting the Second Battle / Close Battle. 

These two concepts have become extremely important within the evolution of multi-domain warfare doctrine. The First Battle / Deep Battle concept is recognition of the fact that, where a defending force can move quickly to prevent territory from being lost, an aggressor will need to have a numerically superior force (ideally 3-to-1) to succeed. Fighting the First Battle / Deep Battle involves pre-emptive deployment to establish a fixed defensive line and a separate mobile forward screen. The latter allows deep fires assets such as rocket artillery and longe-range precision guided weapons to be directed at an attacking force at stand-off distances, engaging enemy units at ranges beyond their ability to return fire. The forward screen will shield artillery assets and canalise the enemy into kill zones while allowing friendly forces to withdraw and regroup as often as possible rather than fighting from fixed positions where they will be subjected to the full weight of enemy artillery. Of course, a fixed line of defences will also be needed, but the mix of static and mobile forces allows the defender to do more with less while sustaining fewer casualties. This approach was well tested in 2022, during the early stages of the Russo-Ukraine conflict. Ukrainian units in light vehicles with anti-armour weapons and ample UAVs were able to deploy rapidly to create forward screens. Though they used ATGMs like Javelin extensively, it was their ability to direct punitive artillery concentrations that blunted the Russian advance so significantly and despite their own units not having heavy armour. Other light infantry units moved rapidly to establish a fixed line of defence by digging trenches with overhead protection. The attacking Russian force was vastly depleted by the time it reached this line and was not able to breach it. A key part of reducing own casualties was using UAVs to direct counter-battery fire at Russian artillery units. The experience of Ukrainian forces has built confidence in the British Army’s light mechanised infantry brigade construct. Currently, these brigades are equipped with Foxhound and Jackal vehicles. Wheeled vehicles provide good operational mobility, but tend to have less than ideal tactical mobility. 

In any future conflict scenario, friendly forces will be surprised or outnumbered. It is very likely that we will lose ground that needs to be re-taken. Therefore, we must retain a capacity to fight the Second Battle / Close Battle. This requires us to retain a credible number of main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and, crucially, manoeuvre support elements, to conduct combined arms manoeuvre. These units can obviously fight the First Battle / Deep Battle effectively, but being primarily tracked, they are less agile and responsive than all-wheeled light mechanised units. Supported by tube and rocket artillery, strike aircraft, attack helicopters, and UAVs, combined arms units will plough their way through an enemy position. This type of head-on approach is the most visceral, brutal and costly type of land warfare, but very often it is unavoidable. Again in Ukraine, the importance of being able to do this was amply demonstrated by Russian forces, which did not begin to make significant territorial gains in 2022 until they resorted to proper combined arms manoeuvre tactics. In particular, the destructive effect of massed artillery fire was pivotal in allowing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to seize and hold ground. Conversely, in 2023, it was Ukraine’s lack of heavy armour and air power that turned the much anticipated counter-offensive into a damp squib. This experience demonstrates that the British Army is right to retain a manoeuvre element with its 3rd (UK) Division constructed along the lines of a traditional heavy armour force. Tracked vehicles provide good tactical mobility, but lack operational mobility. 

Conceptually, the future structure of the British Army makes sense. The two force types complement each other. Expeditionary forces deploy quickly but have less combat power and resilience. Manoeuvre forces have more combat power and resilience, but take longer to deploy. Both light mechanised brigades and armoured brigades should be able to effectively partner with our NATO allies, particularly the US Army. The problem is that the planned equipment types and their distribution within the UK’s two division structure is sub-optimal. This means that combat brigades lack the focus and credibility they need to perform the core range of tasks expected of them. Therefore, this article considers how to invest the two divisions with the resources they need to be credible yet affordable. 

The following diagram shows how a two division army might be structured.

The high level aspiration is to create tow capable war fighting divisions with all the enablers needed for them to operate independently, or as part of a coalition force. Each division would have three (or potentially four) combat brigades. The Manoeuvre Division would look something like this.

The Expeditionary Division would adopt an almost identical structure. In both cases, the two divisions would each have 20,000 soldiers, or 40,000 in a total. An Army of 73,000 ought to be able to generate two credible divisions.

Relatively little extra investment is needed to achieve the above structure, because the British Army’s modernisation plans have already been well conceived to reflect new and emerging doctrine. Also, they encompass equipment purchases that will deliver much of the capability uplift needed. In particular, and in common with our allies, the British Army is being rebuilt around six core vehicle types:

1. Heavy Tracked – The Challenger 3 upgrade programme will deliver a worthwhile life extension to the fleet; however, the increased weight of the platform without a proper automotive upgrade to provide a bump in power creates extra programme risk. Our experience with the failed Warrior CSP shows the dangers of mounting a new turret on an old chassis. The other problem is that we will only upgrade 148 out of previous fleet of 227 Challenger 2s. To acquire an increased number, we would need to manufacture new Challenger hulls. As soon as we do this, Challenger 3 will become a new MBT programme with vastly increased costs, risk and an extended delivery timeline. Unfortunately, we need a minimum of 200 MBTs to equip four armoured regiments plus a training squadron. Without this, partnering with a US ABCT will be problematic. The other serious oversight with the LEP is that it will not upgrade CRAAV (repair and recovery), Titan (bridgelayer) and Trojan (engineer) vehicles. These are essential if we are to clear a path through enemy defences and obstacles.  

2. Medium Tracked – The Ajax programme aims to deliver a family of 589 reconnaissance vehicles on a new medium tracked chassis. There is no need to re-state that this is a troubled programme, apart from pointing out that it isn’t yet clear when the capability will be delivered. At this point, the Army needs a Plan B in case Ajax comes later than advertised or not at all. The other elephant in the room with Ajax is its size and signature. Ukraine has shown that reconnaissance vehicles operating forward without infantry support are vulnerable. Increasingly, drones are being used for reconnaissance. Where vehicles are needed, there s a tendency to use much smaller stealthier platforms. In addition to Ajax, the UK operates a second vehicle in this category, the Warrior IFV. This platform was expected to be upgraded, but was cancelled after the programme ran into difficulties that extended the delivery timeline and doubled the final cost. Warrior is expected to be retired from 2027 and there are no plans to replace it. Within the Army, there are those who believe that the need for a new IFV is more pressing than the need for a reconnaissance vehicle family. The failure hitherto to deliver a vehicle within this category is what most impacts the British Army’s future force credibility. 

3. Medium Wheeled – The Boxer MIV programme is underway and will deliver 623 multi-role armoured vehicles. Although it is late due to supply chain constraints resulting from the pandemic, it will provide mechanised infantry battalions with a much needed capability. Unlike most other wheeled platforms, Boxer combines good operational mobility with very high levels of tactical mobility; but it’s an APC more than an IFV. As such it is intended to deliver dismounted infantry to wherever they are needed. Boxer can operate with Challenger 3 just as the FV432 APC used to be battle grouped with Chieftain, but Boxer is not intended to operate within the direct fire zone because it lacks a turret and protection. Adding armour to Boxer is possible, but compromises its mobility. Ultimately, Boxer will become an entire family of vehicles that will include infantry carriers, command and control, specialist carriers, ambulance, mortar, bridgelayer, repair and recovery, air defence, counter-battery radar, anti-armour, engineer, artillery platform, and, potentially, an assault gun. 

4. Light Wheeled (Medium Protected Mobility) – This is one of three classes of vehicle within the Land Mobility Programme (LMP). The Medium PM requirement reflects the need to acquire a less expensive troop carrying vehicle for light mechanised infantry. This type of vehicle will additionally be used for command and control, ISTAR, GBAD, CBRN, ambulance, tactical support, and other battlefield roles. Medium PM vehicles will replace Mastiff, Ridgeback and Wolfhound, as well as Stormer and FV432 Bulldog. Something like the Thales Bushmaster, KNDS Dingo, GDLS Dingo, or Patria AWV will be acquired.

5. Light Wheeled (Light Protected Mobility) – This class of vehicle is needed to supplement and eventually replace Foxhound and HMT platforms. The Light PM category will be used for command and liaison, command and control, patrol tasks, ISTAR, GBAD, CBRN, tactical support and utility roles. Light PM vehicle options include the Oshkosh JLTV, Thales Hawkei, and KNDS AMPV. 

6. Light Wheeled (Light Mobility) – This class of vehicles will replace the venerable Land-Rover Defender in the general support / utility role. It will also include a lightly armoured version. Light utility vehicles will be supplemented by a further light tactical mobility platform, such as the Polaris MRZR for use by air assault and special forces.  

This overall fleet concept is extremely sound and will give the British Army the utility it needs across multiple war fighting scenarios. It will also streamline the overall number of platform types operated, reducing support costs. The major modification that the plan needs is greater adaption towards high end war fighting against near-peer adversaries. But what does this mean? Within the British Army’s overall headcount cap of 73,000 personnel, the Army’s 2030 plan (released in 2021) envisaged eight brigades as follows: 

• 12th Armoured Brigade
• 20th Armoured Brigade
• 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade
• 7th Light Mechanised Brigade
• 4th Light Brigade 
• 16th Air Assault Brigade 
• 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade
• Army Special Operations Brigade (Ranger Regiment) 

It has been discussed elsewhere how this structure lacks focus and relevance. The most serious compromise is combining Boxer and Challenger 3 in the two armoured brigades. Challenger cannot keep pace with Boxer when deploying long distances by road. Boxer lacks the protection to follow closely behind Challenger 3 in combined arms assaults. The Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade lacks organic infantry and will be a paper formation until Ajax is fully delivered. 4th Light Brigade lacks any kind of protected mobility. It is not clear what role 11th SFA Brigade will play now that the Ranger Regiment has been raised to perform similar tasks. This brigade seems rooted in the last conflict, not the next one. While the Ranger Regiment has shown that it can perform useful Tier 2 SF, training, and mentoring roles, it still disguises the fact that we have too few proper infantry battalions. Therefore, I propose a simple modification to the structure:

• 12th Armoured Brigade becomes a traditional heavy armour brigade with CR3 and a new IFV
• 20th Armoured Brigade becomes a traditional heavy armour brigade with CR3 and a new IFV
• 7th Light Mechanised Brigade becomes a medium brigade with Boxer
• 4th Light Brigade becomes a medium brigade with Boxer
• 16th Air Assault Brigade remains unchanged
• 11th SFA Brigade becomes 11th Light Mechanised Brigade
• 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade becomes an artillery brigade as before, and a second light mechanised brigade is generate from the remaining infantry battalions 
• The Army Special Operations Brigade remains unchanged. 

This revision is based on the existing headcount cap. It delivers 31 total infantry battalions, or 27 full-strength battalions instead of the current 23. The result is two heavy armour brigades, two medium Boxer brigades, two light mechanised brigades, an air assault brigade, and a ranger brigade. 

To deliver this structure, 12th and 20th Armoured Brigades need additional Challenger 3 MBTs plus a new IFV as noted above. I make no recommendation as to what this should be. Assuming Ajax issues can be resolved completely, using a turreted Ares variant would suffice. Alternatively, we should select whatever XM30 option the US Army chooses for its OMFV requirement, A third option is CV90, which is thoroughly capable and proven. Whatever IFV option is adopted, we would generate four armoured infantry battalions supported by four type 44 tank regiments to create two square armoured brigades. This would enable infantry battalions and armoured regiments to be battle grouped together. 

4th and 7th Medium Brigades would be equipped with Boxer. Instead of grouping them with Ajax reconnaissance regiments, I would re-designate the four RAC regiments destined to receive Ajax as Medium Cavalry regiments and equip them with a Boxer “Dragoon” variant. This vehicle would essentially be a UAS mothership designed to perform six roles in support of the four infantry battalions:

1. Reconnaissance and surveillance using UAS
2. Artillery fire control 
3. Direct fire support for infantry
4. Counter UAS
5. Defeating enemy armour at longer ranges 
6. Flank and rear area protection

As with the armoured brigades, having four infantry battalions and four cavalry regiments, allows the different unit types to be battle grouped together. You would not want to single units to have a mix of standard infantry carrier vehicles and turreted vehicles, because giving the infantry additional tasks dilutes the number of boots on the ground and thus their effectiveness in their core dismounted role. 

The Boxer Dragoon or cavalry vehicle would be equipped with a remote control turret mounting a 30×173 mm cannon plus twin ATGMs. The anti-tank missile could be Javelin, MMP Akeron or Spike LR, but Brimstone or a loitering munition like Switchblade 600 or Hero 400EC, would also be useful. The vehicle would have excellent sensors and be able to launch and recover military grade quadcopters with a 50-70 km range. I envisage a crew of five: driver, gunner, commander, and two UAS operators. 

It might make sense to have separate cannon equipped vehicles and UAS carriers. Some degree of experimentation is needed to identify the exact type and mix of vehicles. One option would be to equip each troop with four Boxer Dragoon vehicles plus four JLTV-type 4×4 Light PM vehicles. The latter could be used for stealthy reconnaissance tasks and would mount a remote weapon station plus ATGM. 

For both Heavy and Medium brigades, manoeuvre support vehicles would be essential. Consequently, it would be necessary to upgrade CRAAV, Titan and Trojan, or to find an alternative. Similarly, the medium brigades would need a Boxer repair and recovery vehicle, a Boxer bridgelayer, and a Boxer Engineer vehicle. Fortunately, these additional variants are already planned.  For the Light brigades, acquiring vehicles like Bushmaster / Hawkei or Dingo / JLTV would be suitable. 

Each frontline combat brigade needs organic combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) enablers. At present, we have sufficient, artillery, engineer, signals, logistics, REME, and medical units to support only five brigades. Any increase in headcount would be used to generate more of these, which were lost in 2010. 

So far, extra investment has been directed at manoeuvre units and logistical support. However, recent experience in Ukraine underlines the ongoing relevance and potency of artillery. It has accounted for the largest numbers of casualties on both sides. The UK is presently conducting a modernisation programme to upgrade its M270 G/ MLRS launchers to the A2 standard, as well as the Mobile Fires Platform programme to acquire a 52-calibre 155 mm self-propelled howitzer. An unanswered question is how does the Army replace the 105 mm light gun? One school of thought advocates 120 mm mortars. These can now hit targets at 12-13 kilometres instead of 9 kilometres thanks to improved munition. A mix or turreted and towed 120 mm mortar systems would be lethal but also highly deployable. Another view is to acquire more 155 mm guns, but the logistics of 155 mm ammunition favours something smaller for expeditionary warfare. My own view is that a mix of 155 mm howitzers and 120 mm mortars would suffice. 

The Royal Artillery currently has 12 regular regiments, but probably needs 14 to 16. Of the total, it requires at least four field regiments with 155 mm guns, plus the same number of G/MLRS regiments. To ensure rocket artillery regiments can support medium and light infantry when deployed in an expeditionary capacity, there is a case to acquire a wheeled MLRS system like HIMARS. The RA needs an STA regiment and UAV regiment, plus a short-range air defence (SHORAD) regiment and a medium range air defence (MRAD) regiment with around 96 and 48 launchers respectively. 

Hitherto, UAS have been a Royal Artillery asset; however, the Ukraine conflict has seen attritable and affordable drones used extensively across all unit types. Used for surveillance and strike, the British Army needs to issue them much more widely, even at section and detachment level. First-Person View (FPV) drones overlap with loitering munitions and provide novel targeting opportunities. In a very real sense, low cost UAS have democratised air power by making it more affordable, more immediate, and more efficient. 

The final missing piece of the Army’s modernisation puzzle is C4I. It was originally planned to upgrade the current Bowman system by moving it from a closed to an open architecture standard as part of the Morpheus / LEtacCIS programme. Called EVO, this work stream was cancelled in late 2023 after GDMS failed to deliver what had been agreed. If the Army is to replace Bowman before it comes obsolete, it will need to purchase a system off the shelf. Fortunately, there are several reliable options to choose from, so the cancellation of EVO may be a blessing in disguise. 

The biggest barrier to any uplift in the Army’s overall utility is the lack of personnel. At the moment, frontline units are wholly dependent on the Army Reserve to deploy. This is sub-optimal because reserve troops never spend a decent amount of time training with the units to which they would be attached. This reduces the overall effectiveness of those units. Equally important, using the Army Reserve to backfill an under-strength Regular Army prevents it from carry out its primary functions. These are:

• To provide battlefield casualty replacements
• To provide specialist personnel 
• To generate a second echelon force 
• To drive the expansion of the Army as a whole 

Based on the current and proposed force structures, the ideal peacetime size of the Regular Army is around 90,000 to 100,000 soldiers, plus an Army Reserve of 20,000 to 30,000. 

Funding these changes would need an estimated one-off increase in the Army’s equipment budget of around £10 billion, plus an additional £5 billion per annum in running costs. The two most significant extra costs would be additional personnel and equipment support. Increasing the Defence budget to 2.5% of GDP could achieve the revised force structure within 5 years. 

In summary, I have tried to articulate a revised force that would be more credible and usable than what we have today, but without breaking the bank. The viability of this proposal can be assessed by comparing it to the challenge faced by the US Army in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. As the Cold War threat grew through the 1970s and 1980s, America needed to regenerate its Army  at a time when morale was at an all-time low. This was achieved by improving its career offer, education, and the acquisition of new equipment. The arrival of the M1 Abrams MBT, Bradley M2 IFV, and AH-64 Apache attack helicopter enabled the US Army to achieve a dramatic turnaround in recruitment, the restoration of morale, and a renewed a sense of purpose. This is what the British Army needs today.