REVERSING 40 YEARS OF DECLINE

By Nicholas Drummond

This post is a video that considers how the British Army should be reconfigured to ensure it delivers against Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker’s aspirations to double the Army’s lethality by 2027 and to triple it by 2030.

This video can be watched in 4K on YouTube by following this link:

21 comments

  1. You don’t factor in munition stockpiles, spare parts, more deployable ground-based air defence and homeland defence (armed guards for the defence industry, IAMD). These would be the priorities for me, not more vehicles for manoeuvre units.

    As on X, you call 7th Brigade 7th Light Brigade instead of 7th Light Mechanised Brigade Combat Team. You should back up the apparent claim that 7th Light Mechanised Brigade Combat Team is going away under current plans.

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    1. These are topics for another video. We have to get the basic structure right first. And, in terms of content, I can only base the video on what the Army has publicly stated about its future structure.

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  2. Thank you for caring enough to give this matter some deep thought. For decades the political class certainly hasn’t, despite the rhetoric. The conflict in Ukraine has raged for nearly three years and while I fully endorse our support, there is a complete lack of urgency to re-equip our own army. It is more than ‘woeful’ it is a deliberate policy of managed decline, an abject failure of the first duty of government, the defence of the realm and yet no one is held to account. I just hope our adversaries are willing to wait until 2030 when the MOD’s plan is supposed to be realised.

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  3. I personally would go for 2 divisions, 5 infantry brigades. Requires 14 army infantry battalions.

    Armour Division – 2 Armour brigades (Challenger 3, Ajax IFV, 4 infantry battalions) + 1 armour artillery brigade (M270, K9 Thunder).

    Mechanised Division – 2 Mechanised brigades (Boxer, 6 infantry battalions) + 1 Mechanised artillery brigade (HIMARS, RCH155).

    Each division would have an independent third infantry brigade from army reserve.

    Light infantry would come from 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Royal Marines. Each of these brigades would have a battalion of gurkhas. These two brigades could be slotted into either armour or mechanised division if needed? or could operate on their own. They would have their own artillery units.

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  4. I like your proposals and hope they become reality. Although I’d like to see additional air defence capability in the orbat.

    Your plan includes just 2 armoured cavalry regts equipped with Ajax. With 245 turreted variants on order, that’s probably more than enough. Where would you put the spares?

    Your plans includes 4 armoured infantry battalions equipped with Ares. With just 93 on order, how would you equip all 4?

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    1. The proposal would require the mix of Ajax variants to be changed. I would revise the order as follows:
      – Ajax 120
      – Ares 218
      – Athena 112
      – Apollo 50
      – Argus 51
      – Atlas 38

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      1. Nic, You know this is not going to happen, changing the contract again is impossible so the British Army needs to deploy the 589 Ajax variants accordingly:-

        Ajax stay at 245 the breakdown:-

        Cavalry Regiments 2 x 44 = 88

        Armoured Infantry 4 x 8 = 32 (8 in each Recce Pl)

        Armoured Infantry 2 per Pl as Fire Support/Pl Commanders vehicle = 72

        Tank Regiments 2 x 8 = 16

        Artillery Regiments FOO Party 2 x 8 = 16

        Total Ajax in new structure = 224 (This fully utilises the Ajax Variant and delivers 40mm turreted fire support vehicles for the fighting company’s.

        Additional Ares IFV required = 140 is required to equip 4 x Armoured Infantry Battalion with an IFV (you wouldn’t need to worry about a turret variant as you have Ajax providing Fire support at Pl level, it would be advantageous to have a RwIP on this 140 vehicles in different configurations like the Moog RwIP can deliver, which would provide SHORAD/C-UAS at Pl level the only capability missing is mortar 120mm this would require an Ares Variant of NEMO, now this is surely deliverable using an AJAX hull and adding the NEMO turret, 32 in total required.

        There would be enough of the other variants to provide the additional capabilities missing like Athena, Argus, Atlas and Apollo for each Armoured Infantry Battalion.

        Total Ares IFV&120mm Mortar NEM0 =172 (This is doable below the £1Bn mark)

        This has to be achievable by 2030 theses changes and requirement are fully doable and consistent with keeping production line with work, (Industrial Strategy) consistent platform commonality, spares and reducing through life cycle costs.

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    2. The US Army earlier this year cut the cavalry/scouts in Stryker (medium) and light infantry brigades. This suggests to me that scouting by humans riding in vehicles is becoming less important in modern, peer-on-peer warfare.

      The RAC / British calvary has had armoured cars and then CVR(T) since at least WW2. Old traditions die hard but maybe it is time to move on from this history, even though the Ajax have already been paid for using a fixed price contract and many have already been assembled.

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  5. Great work Nick! (and Chris) – overall I agree entirely. On details, I would differ.

    1. I don’t think you can renegotiate Ajax numbers at this point, so buy enough additional Ares for one armoured Inf Bttln for each of your Brigades, and retain 2 Ajax equipped Cav; so they basically become Armoured Cavalry brigades, and we could hopefully plug in an allied Armoured Infantry battalion into each (Danes, French, Dutch…. ???) but this further reduction of 4 infantry battalions gives you a lot of the soldiers you need for other units.
    2. I know this is about pragmatic re-org and change, but this vision of the army remains woefully under equipped for air defence, at medium, short and C-UAS levels, not to mention British forces are entirely devoid of SAM’s that have ABM functionality. Perhaps moving the ridiculous loudspeakers from Ajax turrets would allow the mounting of a small AESA, such as one of the Leonardo models, to give half the Ajax a limited C-UAS / SHORAD capability, with of course the costs in acquisition, integration with FC, and the CTAS air bursting ammo.
    3. I like the 4 identical Bde’s in 3 Div, so if we stick with the focus on Estonia as our central commitment to NATO in continental Europe, there is a 1 in 4 rotation of Bde’s – however, that would probably require more kit, for training and maintenance cover?

    How do you see this structure, sitting within this newish concept of ARRQ being a “theatre reserve” Corps for NATO?

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  6. The French Army has 110,000 soldiers excluding the Paris firefighters, two divisions and SIX manoeuvre brigades, or 6.5 if you count the Franco-German brigade. Nicholas, you want the British Army to have two divisions of EIGHT total manoeuvre brigades with only 73,000 troops. Something does not add up here!

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    1. A brigade usually has 4K or 5K soldiers. A division has 20K to 25K. So an Army of 73K should be able to generate two divisions of 25K and have 23K left over to resource training, logistics, medical, engineer, intelligence, MP, SF, and other support functions.

      If you want three divisions, and there are many who believe that we should have an Army of this size, then you need at least 100K.

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      1. So by those numbers for divisions, the French have 50K soldiers in two divisions and 60K men doing something else (excluding fighting fires in Paris). The French have 45% of Army soldiers in two divisions and 55% in other tasks. You advocate for around 50/73 = 68% in two divisions and 32% in other tasks.

        The French Army also has the Gendarmerie for homeland defence / anti-sabotage.

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    2. hi Fred,

      two points on the French army that are linked to them only having a two division army:

      1. 20k+ of their troops are assigned to defend their overseas territories and do not form part of their two divisions.
      2. french units are much larger than British ones. For example, a French inf battalion has 5 rifle companies compared to 3 in the British army.

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  7. Again an enjoyable post in this blog – but I have a few questions. To put things in context, I believe the greatest military threat is Russia, against which we need strong combined arms divisions – but we’ll never transport them in Africa, Middle East, Taïwan / China – for which special forces / security assistance are all we need. It is different for the navy which is truly global, and to a lesser extent the aviation. Against Russia, I do not believe that UK could leave land forces to other countries eg. Poland / Germany, and only focus on navy / aviation, even though it may well be that such a “division of labor” / specialisation would be more cost effective and affordable.

    1. Is there a value in having so many “light infantry” battalions in the context of a Russian threat and less interventionism abroad
    2. What is the point of the light infantry battalions in the 4 armoured / mechanised brigades ?
    3. Do the “rangers” really belong to the 1st division or should they be integrated in the “joint command” with SAS & Co since they are “super light” infantry quasi special forces – or possibly in the 77th brigade ?
    4. What is the value of a “rapid deployment division” which will be deployed piecemeal and never as a combined arms division ? Isn’t preferable to have 2 real combined arms divisions which will include heavy – medium and possibly light mechanised, since even in hight intensity warfare it might useful to supplement the heavies with light infantry especially in urban opérations / complex terrain.
    5. What is the role of the rapid reaction corps, limited to several signals battalion and logistics battalions (though I understand the value of “port & maritime” units)
    6. Field army include a lot of engineers, signals and medical units compared to the divisions / brigades organic support : is the balance right ?
    7. There is no AD in the divisions, and pitifully few in field army. In Ukraine most of the drones are FPV … against which missiles are not a protection – but is it reasonable to have so few AD platforms ?

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    1. A bit of a random question for you Nicholas.

      If 11 bde can’t be upgraded into a traditional regular infantry brigade, as many commentators advocate, then what should be done with it? Perhaps a joint regular/reserve brigade, a bespoke bde minus formation, or simply disband it and use its manpower elsewhere: any thought?

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      1. Each of the four battalions in 11 SFA Brigade has 250 soldiers. It should be entirely possible to recruit the additional headcount to restore them in size to their previous strength. But it will take time. If this proved problematic and their personnel were absorbed into other existing units, then the Army would basically lose another four battalions. I don’t think it can be reduced in size further, not with the current geopolitical situation.

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  8. Thank you Nicholas. I guess where I’m coming from is that, however high or low the defence budget, the treasury will always set a cap, be that a direct financial limit or manpower ceiling. If such a cap doesn’t allow for an expansion of 11 bde then I was just wondering if it’s better for it to be liquidated and its workforce used in other parts of the army, or for it to be left as it is?

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    1. Even if the headcount cap remains unchanged at 73,000, you could still re-allocate personnel from other units without compromising the overall structure. I have modelled this in some detail by taking the total number of Army units by regiment or corps type and allocating a fixed headcount to each one. So infantry battalions each have 670, cavalry regiments have 550, etc etc. This yields around 4,000 miscellaneous personnel on top of HQs, training and admin units. All this said, I think we have reached a point in time where the Army has to grow in size. As I explain above, we need to be able to field two proper divisions. To do this we need a minimum of 80,000 to 90,000 soldiers or ideally 100,000 with the capacity to double the number within 6 months in an emergency. I believe that the penny is starting to drop within government circles but we’re not there yet. So leave 11 Brigade as it is until we can expand it.

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      1. I’ve heard online that 11 brigade is reroling to a tactical recce-strike which will become the deep recce strike for 1 divHow would you structure this formation would it be a combination of vehicle mounted 120 mortar Loitering munition launcher and long range ATGW vehicle. The recce side could be a mixed drones and EW warfare and ISTAR for the Div artillery. This could be the deep battle for 1 DIV.

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      2. In the model I have developed, both 7th and 4th Light Mechanised Infantry brigades would be able to perform a reconnaissance strike role. I envisage them being equipped with light and medium protected mobility vehicles (JLTV / Dingo etc), with organic 120 mm mortars, anti-tank weapons ((Javelin / MMP Akeron), and loitering munitions (Hero 400 / Anduril Altius). I have placed 11th Brigade in 3rd (UK) Division as a Mechanised Infantry Brigade with Boxer. Assuming we were able to acquire a turreted version of Boxer, I see this formation also carrying out a reconnaissance strike role with the same weapon types, but having increased resilience due to Boxer’s greater protection. For either brigade type, light or medium, they would be equipped to fight the deep battle. While vehicles provide essential mobility, the key enabler is a software defined C4I system linked to a deployable network. This is what links forward unit sensors to artillery effectors located behind them.

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